From 'Atoms for Peace' to the JCPOA and its collapse, enrichment, sanctions, and the 2025 tensions — every claim attributed, multiple framings side by side. Bidar takes no side.
Iran's nuclear program began in the 1950s under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with US and Western European support; in 1957 Iran and the US signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement under Eisenhower's 'Atoms for Peace.' The US-supplied Tehran Research Reactor went critical in 1967 fueled with highly enriched uranium, and in 1974 the Shah founded the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran with plans for up to 20 reactors. Iran was an original signatory of the NPT in 1968 (ratified 1970). After 1979 the program was suspended for a period, then revived with assistance principally from Russia and China.
The program's core comprises uranium enrichment at Natanz and Fordow (a deeply fortified underground plant), the Bushehr power station (a Russian-built light-water reactor operational since 2011), and the Arak heavy-water complex and reactor. Iran officially states its program is entirely peaceful — for electricity and medical applications — and frames it as a right under the NPT. By contrast, the IAEA and Western governments have voiced concern over aspects with potential military application, notably Natanz's potential to produce weapons-usable uranium and Arak's potential to produce plutonium. Both framings are presented as attributed positions.
Iranian officials repeatedly cite a fatwa attributed to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei holding that producing, stockpiling, and using nuclear weapons is 'haram,' presenting it as evidence the program is peaceful. The fatwa's authenticity, precise scope, and binding nature are contested among analysts; some scholars and US- and Israel-linked think tanks argue it was stated only in speeches rather than in writing and primarily forbids 'use.' Critics argue a fatwa can be revisable or subject to 'expediency,' while supporters treat it as expressing durable policy.
In August 2002 the exiled opposition group National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed the existence of the undeclared Natanz (enrichment) and Arak (heavy-water) sites; satellite imagery soon confirmed construction. Then-IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei inspected Natanz in February 2003 and issued his first special report in June 2003. Inspectors found traces of enriched uranium on centrifuges at Natanz, although Iran had said it had not yet introduced nuclear material there. The IAEA demanded full disclosure by the end of October 2003, opening a long-running dossier.
Between 2006 and 2010 the UN Security Council adopted six resolutions on Iran's nuclear program demanding suspension of enrichment and imposing sanctions. These formed one track of a 'dual-track approach' by the P5+1, pairing pressure with incentives. Negotiations proceeded unevenly and culminated in November 2013 in Geneva in the interim Joint Plan of Action, negotiated by teams led by Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and Catherine Ashton. That interim deal set the stage for the comprehensive talks.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was concluded on 14 July 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 (the US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) with the EU. Iran agreed to cap enrichment at 3.67%, cut operating centrifuges to roughly 5,060 IR-1 machines, and reduce its enriched-uranium stockpile to 300 kg. Iran accepted intensive IAEA inspections and long-term monitoring; in exchange, nuclear-related sanctions were lifted. The deal also contained 'sunset' clauses that would gradually remove certain limits after 10 to 25 years.
On 8 May 2018 President Donald Trump announced US withdrawal from the JCPOA and ordered the reimposition of nuclear-related sanctions. The administration called the deal 'unacceptable,' arguing it did not permanently block a path to a weapon, failed to curb Iran's regional behavior, and returned economic resources to Tehran. The decision launched a 'maximum pressure' campaign with sweeping sanctions on energy, banking, and automotive sectors. European partners opposed the withdrawal, and some analysts warned it raised proliferation risks, while supporters cast it as leverage for a better deal.
Following the US withdrawal, from May 2019 Iran announced it would progressively scale back JCPOA commitments, and the IAEA confirmed in July 2019 that Iran had breached the 300-kg stockpile limit. Iran then raised enrichment first to 4.5%, to 20% in January 2021, and to 60% in April 2021 — a level technically a short step from weapons-grade. Tehran described these as reversible, reciprocal steps within the deal's mechanism, contingent on sanctions relief. Iran also reduced some IAEA monitoring in 2021, and by 2024 its enriched-uranium stockpile had grown far beyond JCPOA caps.
Indirect talks to revive the JCPOA began in Vienna in April 2021 but reached no agreement. In April 2025 a new round of indirect talks took place between US envoy Steve Witkoff and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi via Omani mediation, but these too stalled after several rounds and gave way to military conflict in June 2025. In August 2025 the European three triggered the 'snapback' mechanism, reinstating prior sanctions in September 2025. Reportedly, at the close of February 2026 talks Oman's foreign minister cited 'substantial' progress, while the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization said Iran would not accept limits on enrichment — a developing and contested situation.
Iran's nuclear program is also framed through regional security: Israel has described it as an existential threat and some Gulf Arab states have voiced concern, while Iran frames it as peaceful and a sovereign right. On 13 June 2025 Israel launched an air campaign against Iranian nuclear and military facilities, and the US joined on 21 June with 'Operation Midnight Hammer,' striking Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks, and a US-brokered ceasefire took effect on 24 June after 12 days. Damage assessments are sharply contested — US officials spoke of the program being 'obliterated,' while some intelligence assessments estimated the setback at only a few months. The matter remains developing and highly contested.